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INTRODUCTION'

An administrative agency is a governmental authority, other than a
court or legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties through
rule making or adjudication. In essence, an administrative agency is a
unique conglomerate of the three facets of our governmental makeup,
whose nature is incongruous to the concept of separation of powers-the
touchstone of our system of government.2
Administrative law concerns itself with the powers and procedures of
administrative agencies, including the law governing judicial review of
administrative action.3
This article is primarily concerned with the procedural due process
requirements in administrative law with respect to rule making and adjudication under the relatively new4 FLORIDA UNIFORM ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT OF 196 1,' and as such will analyze the A.P.A. in operation
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman Research and Writing, University of Miami School of Law.
1. This Survey does not purport to cover the total scope of procedural due process, but
will be limited to administrative procedure. Included within are cases reported through 187
Southern Reporter 2d. The criminal aspect of procedural due process has been amply
surveyed in Wills, Criminal Law & Procedure, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 246 (1965), and many
of the ramifications of civil procedural due process are alluded to in Massey and Westen,
Civil Procedure, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 594.
2. The administrative process is often compared or contrasted with the judicial process,
the executive process, and the legislative process. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & GOVERNMENT 11 (1960).
3. Administrative action is here meant to include both the rule making power of the
agency and its power to issue final orders.
4. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-280 § 1, amended by Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 63-552 § 1.
5. FLA. STAT. § 120. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, hereinafter referred to and cited as
145
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since its inception.6 This analysis will necessarily concentrate upon the
cases that have been decided under the ACT, but will not be limited thereto.
New sections of the A.P.A., which greatly affect administrative procedure,
but which have not yet been subjected to judicial interpretation, will also
be analyzed where relevant. This article will seek to present to the reader
a picture of the practical effects of the A.P.A.7 and to otherwise acquaint
him with its diverse ramifications.
It should be noted that while the A.P.A. applies only to state agencies
which the ACT defines as "boards, commissions, departments, or officers
authorized by law to make rules, except the legislature and judicial departments of government, the military, and the governor," 8 the effective
impact of this procedural codification should apply to county and municipal agencies as well. Although the legislatively defined scope of the A.P.A.
does not encompass these local agencies, it is to be expected that the courts
will use its provisions as a yardstick to determine the procedural level with
which these agencies must comply. As of this Survey no specific case has
definitively set this criterion, but analogy to court cases dealing with local
agencies will be made with the A.P.A. wherever possible.
PURPosE OF THE A.P.A.
The primary purpose of the A.P.A. is to set forth a uniform method
of procedure under which each administrative agency will be obligated to
operate so as to afford the regulated individual the fundamental procedural guarantees insured to him by the federal' ° and state" constitutions.
Both constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. The Florida Constitution further
provides that the courts of the state shall be open, so that every person
for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall
the A.P.A. or the ACT, consisting of Parts I, II, III, created by Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-280,
and replacing former chapter 120., GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO BOARDS, COMMISSIONS,
ETC. Florida's ACT is fashioned after the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act,
The National Conference of Commissioners on Union State Laws 329-336 (1944). For
an extensive analysis of the Model Act see COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1965).
6. For an analysis of administrative procedural due process before the inception of the
ACT, see generally 8 MIAMI L.Q. 176 (1954); 10 MIAMI L.Q. 129 (1956); 12 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 288 (1958); 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 501 (1960); 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1962);
18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 888 (1964).

7. The Florida A.PA. can be compared with the FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACT, 60 STAT.
237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952). For a comprehensive analysis of the Federal Act and
its effect see JAFFE, -JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); Swartz, The

Administrative Act in Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1173 (1954).
8. FLA. STAT. § 120.021(1) (1965).
9. FLA. STAT. § 120.011 (1965)

Legislative Intent for Part I.
It is the intent of the legislature to establish a uniform procedure to be used by
agencies in adopting rules and to provide notice of the adoption and content of rules,
and that Part I shall supersede all other laws on the same subject.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12.
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have remedy by due process of law.'" These are the basic constitutional
provisions.
The essential elements of due process of law are notice and an opportunity to be heard in an orderly proceeding before a tribunal having jurisdiction of a matter. The constitutional requirement of procedural due
process is of course applicable to administrative proceedings.' 8
Although notice and hearing are the minimum essential requisites
whereby administrative adjudications comply with this requirement, 4
more is demanded of an administrative agency because of the power vested
in it. Most administrative agencies comprise a single unit which has quasilegislative power to promulgate rules and quasi-judicial power to determine
whether its rules have been violated, and to enforce them appropriately.
Thus, to provide a safeguard against abuse of these powers the A.P.A.
,contains provisions for a uniform procedure to be followed by agencies
adjudicawhen adopting rules,'1 5 a uniform procedure for administrative
7
tion,'" and a uniform procedure for judicial review.'
PART I: RULE MAKING' S

A. Administrative Rules 9
In Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,'° the dual problem
of rule making and venue arose concerning the A.P.A. Milk producers in
the Pensacola Milk Marketing Area had voted to put themselves under
12. FLA. CONST. DECL. oF RIGHTS § 4.
13. Hime v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 61 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1952).

14. Keating v. State, 173 So.2d 673 (1965).
15. FLA. STAT. § 120.011 (1965).
16. FLA. STAT. § 120.20 (1965).
17. FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1965).

18. There is a distinction between "rule" and "order" as regards agencies, but ofttimes
the terms are interchanged and confused. Briefly summarized, a rule has broader ramifications in that it has general application which affects the rights of the public or other
interested parties, similar to the usual legislative enactment. Usually an order is more specific
and applies only to a particular instance or party, similar to the usual judicial pronouncement. See FLA. STAT. § 120.21, Definitions for Part II of the A.P.A.
The confusion may lie in the word usage of "order" and "final order." Section 120.021
defines rule as, "Rule means rule, order, . . .", whereas § 120.30, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ON VALIDITY OF RULES, uses the term "rule" and not "order." In § 120.031, RavIEw OF
AGENCY ORDERS, the language is "order" and "final order."
The appellate relief to be had from a rule is quite different from that of an order. As
per FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1965) an action for declaratory judgment as regards the validity
of a rule set by an agency may be brought in the circuit court of the county in which such
person resides or in which the executive offices of the agency are maintained. With regard
to final orders, FLA. STAT. § 12031 (1965), any person may bring certiorari to the district
court of appeal within the time and in the manner prescribed by the Florida appellate
rules. Venue will lie in the county wherein the hearing before the hearing officer or agency
was conducted, or if venue cannot be thus determined, then the appellate district wherein the
agency's executive offices are located.
19. FLA. STAT. § 120.021 (1963).
20. 146 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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the control and jurisdiction of the milk commission. Polar, dissatisfied
with the election, reduced the price it paid to its producers for milk. As a
result of the action taken by Polar, the commission ordered Polar (and
others similarly situated) to pay for the purchased milk on the same basis
in effect before the election and subsequent control of the commission.
Polar refused to comply with the order and a declaratory decree was
sought by the commission in Leon County to determine the validity of the
order. Polar moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Polar, a
domestic corporation, is located in Escambia County, Florida, where the
books of the corporation and its entire bookkeeping facilities are located.
All agreements between it and its producers had been made in Escambia
County where the violation, vel non, occurred. The commission filed the
action in Leon County because the executive offices of the agency are
located there.21 It was the commission's contention that since the order
was applicable to Polar and others similarly situated, it was a rule and the
commission was entitled to lay venue in the county wherein its offices were
located. Polar argued that it was protected by the general venue provisions 22 and was not affected by the special venue provisions of the A.P.A.2 s
The trial court denied the motion.24
Two interesting questions were raised by Polar, and although they
deal with two separate sections of the AcT they are so interrelated that it
is necessary to discuss them together. The venue question (section
120.30(1)) was directly dependent upon the collateral question of
whether the order set down by the commission was in fact a rule within
the purview of the A.P.A. (section 120.021 (2)). Both questions also depended on whether the commission was considered an "affected" or
"interested" party within the meaning of the A.P.A.
The district court of appeal reversed 25 and remanded the case for
21. FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1965).

22. FLA. STAT. § 46.04 (1927).
23. Supra note 21.
24. The special venue provision, of the A.P.A. on which the chancellor relied, denying
Polar's motion to dismiss, applies to "any state board, commission, department or officer
authorized by law to make rules, except the legislature and judicial departments of the
government, the military and the governor." FLA. STAT. § 120.021 (1965). But Part III of
this AcT, relating to judicial review, provides that "only an affected party may obtain a
judicial declaration as to the validity, meaning or application of any rule by bringing an
action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of the county in which such person
resides or in which the executive offices of the agency are maintained." FLA. STAT. § 120.30(1)
(1965).
25. Supra note 20, at 612. The court stated that venue statutes are characterized as
statutes of convenience and that this philosophy would be defeated if,
(Ilt would be possible for state agencies headquartered in Tallahassee to adopt by
unilateral action rules and regulations and to issue orders affecting the rights of large
segments of business and industry operating in the state, and by suit for declaratory
decree instituted in Leon County require all affected parties to incur the inconvenience and expense of defending the action hundreds of miles from the county in
which they live or maintain offices for the transaction of their business.
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further proceedings,26 holding that: (1) The order of the commission was

not a rule within the purview of the Act in that it was not one of general
2 7 but was directed primarily
application,
to Polar as an individual milk
distributor, and only secondarily to the other distributors of that area
similarly situated and, (2) The commission is not an interested party as
defined in section 120.021,8 so as to be classified as an affected party
under the special venue provision set forth in section 120.30,29 which
allows an affected party to obtain judicial declaration as to the validity,
meaning or application of any rule.
In essence, the court limited the definition of a rule under the A.P.A.
to promulgations of general application and held that only one to whom
the rule applies can petition for declaratory judgment and thus invoke the
special venue provisions of the A.P.A.
B. Adoption"° and Filing of Rules"'
Only two cases touched upon the adoption, filing and publication of
agency rules within the Survey period,82 with neither decision offering a
judicial interpretation of the pertinent sections. Certain amendments to
these sections have introduced a radical change in the procedure required
for the filing, the effective date, and the publication of all agency rules.
26. FA. STAT. § 53.17 (1965) provides for a transfer of venue. There are no provisions
in the A.P.A. for an agency to bring an action for declaratory judgment.
27. FLA. STAT. § 120.021(2) (1965). Rule means rule, order, regulation, standard,
statement of policy, requirement, procedure, or interpretation of general application,
including the amendment or repeal thereof, adopted by an agency to implement,
interpret or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its
organization or procedure affecting the rights, duties, privileges or immunities of,
or procedures available to the public or interested parties .. . . [Emphasis added.]
28. Supra note 20, at 612. Stripped of its irrelevant verbiage, this section of the statute
defines the term "rule" as a rule or order of general application adopted by an agency which
affects the rights of the public or other interested parties.
29. Supra note 21.
30. FA. STAT. § 120.031 (1965).
31. FLA. STAT. § 120.041 (1965).
32. In Roper v. Structural Pest Control Comm'n, 155 So.2d 846 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) the
commission had permanently revoked the petitioner's licenses. On appeal the petitioners
urged that the order of revocation be quashed because the rules of the respondent had not
been published in accordance with the A.P.A. (Infra note 34) and thus had no legal effect. It
was also argued that respondent erred in permanently revoking petitioners' licenses, as such
revocation was in violation of the provisions of FLA. STAT. § 482.171. The court found that
the rules had been properly filed with the office of the Secretary of State in accordance with
the A.PA., and held that there was no merit to petitioners' contention in this regard. The
court did find that commission could not revoke petitioner's licenses permanently because
FLA. STAT. § 482.071 contained the provision that revocation could not be for a period in
excess of two years. The court quashed the permanent revocation and allowed the petitioners the right to re-apply for licenses after two years. In Alderman v. Conner, 152 So.2d
819, 820 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) the court merely cited A.P.A. § 120.321 which states that,
"Nothing contained in section 120.041(3) and (4) shall affect or repeal the provisions of
chapter 601." The case dealt with the revocation of a fruit dealer's license under the Florida
Citrus Code, FLA. STAT. ch. 601 (1965).
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Previously, an agency had to file any new rule with the Secretary of
State,3" the new rule becoming legally effective fifteen days after
filing. 4 Now the rule becomes legally effective upon filing, but does not
become operative until thirty days after the summary of the rule is published in a register provided for in the A.P.A 5 Section 120.041 reads as
follows:
FILING AND TAKING EFFECT OF RULES

(1) Each agency shall file with the secretary of state a certified
copy of each rule adopted by it.
(2) Copies of all agreements, cooperative and reciprocal, or
contracts and amendments thereto between federal and
state agencies, between the several states and their agencies,
and between state agencies and local units of government
shall be filed with the secretary of state but shall not be
published. 6
(3) Each rule hereafter adopted shall become legally effective
only upon filing but shall not become operative until thirty
(30) days after the summary of the rule is published in the
register except for emergency rules as provided in subsection. The operative date of any rule may be postponed
subsequent to thirty days after the summary is published in
the register by specifying such date in the rule adopted. 7
The innovation is twofold: (1) It creates an official compilation,
publication and distribution of all pertinent rules adopted by an agency,"8
and, (2) It extends the notice requirement of fifteen days to well over
thirty days, since the rule does not become operative until thirty days
after it is published by the Secretary of State89 whose publication is
monthly.4
33. FLA. STAT. § 120.10, created by FLA. LAWS 1955, ch. 29777 § 1, replaced by FLA. STAT.

§ 120.041, created by FLA. LAWS 1961, ch. 61-280 § 1, and amended by FLA. LAWS 1963,
ch. 63-552 § 2.
34. FLA. STAT. § 120.11, created by FLA. LAWS 1955, ch. 29777 § 2, replaced by FLA. STAT.
§§ 120.041, 120.051, created by FLA. LAWS 1961, ch. 61-280 § 1, as amended by FLA. LAWS
1963, ch. 63-552 §§ 2, 3.

35. FLA. STAT. § 120.051(b) (1965) passed in conjunction with FLA. STAT. § 120.041(3)
(1965).
36. Section (2) was not contained in the prior chapter 120., but the section is self explanatory and will not be discussed here.
37. Emphasis added.
38. Before the 1963 revision of the A.P.A. there was no uniform system for a central
collection, recordation and publication of administrative rules.
39. FLA. STAT. § 120.041(3) (1965) and FLA. STAT. § 120.051(1)(b) (1965).
40. FLA. STAT. § 120.051(1)(e) (1965) qualifies §§ 120.041(3) and 120.051(1)(b).

All rules and regulations general in form but of such local or limited application as
to make their inclusion in the Florida administrative code or any revision or supplement thereof impractical, undesirable or unnecessary shall be omitted therefrom but
shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state. The exclusion of such local or
limited rules from publication in the Florida administrative code shall not affect
their validity or effectiveness.
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As is pointed out in subsection (3), the operative date may be postponed beyond the thirty days after the summary is published in the
register by the devise of a specification of a later date in the adopted rule
itself.,"
Some confusion may arise from the language of subsection (3), to
wit: the terms "legally effective" and "operative." The previously applicable section42 only used the phrase "effective or enforceable" and
specifically provided that the date of the effectiveness and enforceability
of rules was fifteen days after filing. As the subsection now reads, the rule
becomes "legally effective" upon filing and becomes "operative" only after
publication, a difference of well over thirty days. No mention of "enforceability" is made and the question still remains. A reading of the
entire section suggests that the enforceability date of any rule is thirty
days after its publication, but some clarification of the language would
appear to be in order.
It should be noted that the procedure for emergency rules, excluded
from the filing requirement of subsection (3), has also been radically
44
changed from the replaced section of chapter 120."' The new subsection
reads as follows:
In any particular proceedings in which a state agency makes a
finding, including a statement of facts constituting an alleged
emergency, in writing, that the adoption of a rule is necessary
for the immediate preservation of the public health, peace, and
FLA. STAT. § 120.051(1) (i)

(1965) must also be taken into consideration when dealing with
limited or local rules.
(1) The secretary of state shall:
(i) Before excluding any rule of limited or local application from publication
in the Florida administrative code where such exclusion is objected to by the
agency adopting the rule, obtain an interpretation from the attorney general as
to whether the rule is of such limited or local application as to warrant exclusion.
41. Supra text accompanying note 37.
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.10 and 120.11 (1955) both repealed by Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-280
§ 4; Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-516, § 1. Section 120.11 read as follows:
No rule or regulation adopted on or after January 1, 1956, shall take effect or be
enforceable, except as herein provided, until fifteen days after the filing thereof as
required by § 120.10. No rule or regulation adopted before January 1, 1956, shall be
effective or enforceable after January 1, 1956, until the same shall be filed with the
secretary of state.
43. FLA. STAT. § 120.14 (1955) repealed, Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-280, § 4; Fla. Laws 1961,
ch. 61-516, § 1.
Upon affidavit by the properly authorized officer of any such agency that an emergency exists which will gravely affect the health, safety or welfare of the citizens
of this state, any such rule or regulation adopted and promulgated because of such
emergency shall become enforceable as the rule or regulation may provide if a copy
thereof shall be filed with the secretary of state within five days of such date; provided, however, that such rule or regulation shall not be enforceable or binding during such period of five days upon any party without actual notice of said rule or
regulation. Upon failure of the agency to file such emergency rule or regulation
within five days, such rule or regulation shall not be deemed to have been adopted
because of an emergency and shall have no effect until filed in the office of the secretary of state for a period of fifteen days as heretofore provided.
44. FLA. STAT. § 120.041(3) excludes emergency rules from the filing requirement.
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safety or general welfare, a rule may be adopted as an emergency
rule. A rule adopted as an emergency rule shall remain in effect
ninety days, unless such a rule so adopted be deemed necessary
as a permanent rule, in which case it shall be adopted in the
manner otherwise provided in this part. 5
In the new subsection the requirement of an affidavit, signed by the properly authorized officer of the agency and submitted to the Secretary of
State, attesting that an emergency did exist, has been eliminated. Similarly, the requirement that a copy of the rule itself be submitted is conspicuously absent. Possible ramifications of these deletions become
clearer when viewed in the light of still another conspicuously absent
provision of notice.
It had been provided that no emergency rule was enforceable unless
submitted to the Secretary of State within five days of the date of adoption
and that such rule or regulation was not enforceable or binding during
such period upon any party without actual notice of the rule or regulation. " If the rule was not filed within the five days after adoption then the
rule was held not to be an emergency rule, and thus it had to be filed with
the Secretary for fifteen days to be effective.
From a literal interpretation of the former subsection the theme appears to be public protection from a necessary evil-the emergency rule.
Although emergency rules are often both necessary and proper, they
present the hazard of unknown potential restrictions on those who may
be affected by them; hence, the legislature took pains to provide notice to
the unsuspecting. However, with the new subsection all vestiges of notice
are gone and the dangerous possibility of a rule existing without either
public knowledge or opportunity for discovery appears to be great. No
matter have grave the emergency, based on the scope of sections 120.031041 and 120.051, some form of notice should be required and the various
agencies should have to follow a more refined procedure in such situations.
47

C. Publication

As previously stated, no rule, unless of a local or very limited application, becomes operative unless it is first published in the register.4 9 By
virtue of section 120.041(3), and passed in conjunction with it, section
120.05150 provides Florida with a permenant compilation of all agency
48

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

FLA. STAT. § 120.041(4)

(1965).
Supra note 43.
FLA. STAT. § 120.051 (1965).
Supra note 40.
Supra note 35.
Section 120.051 reads, in part, as follows:

(1) The secretary of state shall:
(a) Conduct a systematic and continuing study of the rules and regulations of
this state for the purpose of reducing their number and bulk, removing redundancies and unnecessary repetitions, and make such changes in style and
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rules and also with a monthly bulletin and supplement. The compilation,

now available, is entitled the Florida Administrative Code5l and is the
official compilation of rules and regulations of all regulatory state agencies.
Published along with the Code is the bulletin, Florida Administrative
Register, in which every rule must first be published to become operative.
The Code is supplemented monthly, or as often as possible.
D. Disqualificationof Members of any Commission or

Administrative Body5 2
In Bieley v. Brown,53 the appellant, a practicing attorney, instituted
suit in chancery to enjoin a Deputy Industrial Commissioner from hearing
any further cases in which the appellant represented claimants before the

Florida Industrial Commission. The chancellor denied the temporary injunction and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The district court held that since appellant was attempting to secure
a blanket disqualification of a commissioner his action was improper in
two respects. In the first instance, exclusive procedure for disqualification
of a commissioner is set forth in the A.P.A.:
Any member of a commission elected by the people of the state

and authorized by the statutes to exercise judicial powers may
be disqualified, either voluntarily or involuntarily, from serving
in a particular investigation, inquiry, hearing, trial, appeal,
matter or thing on the same grounds, in the same manner and to

the same extent as circuit judges may be disqualified from acting
in a judicial capacity.5"

Although there is only a reference in section 120.09 (1) of the A.P.A.
to section 38.10 (which actually deals with the disqualification of judges)
form as shall be required to comply with the rules promulgated under paragraph (c).
(b) Publish in a permanent compilation entitled Florida administrative code
all rules adopted by each agency, and publish a monthly bulletin entitled the
Florida administrative register containing a summary of and an index to all
rules filed during the preceding month. Supplementation of the code shall be
made monthly or as often as is practicable.
51. Sections 120.051(1)(f)-(g) and (2) provide for copies of the code and register.
(1) The secretary of state shall:
(f) Make copies of the Florida administrative code and register available for
sale at a price fixed by the secretary of state. Copies shall be made available to
other state agencies at cost.
(g) Furnish free copies of the Florida administrative code to the following:
one set each to the supreme court of the United States; the circuit court
of appeals of the fifth circuit of the United States; the federal district courts
within the state; the Florida supreme court; the Florida district courts of appeal; the Florida circuit courts; ...
(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law each agency may print its rules
in cooperation with and through the secretary of state; ...
52. FLA. STAT. § 120.09 (1955) republished to conform to FLA. STAT. § 120.09 (1961).
53. 168 So.2d 552 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
54. FLA. STAT. § 120.09(1) (1965). (Emphasis added.)
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the court stated that "... an examination of the original title to this act
(chapter 120) 5 clearly indicates the Legislative intent to make this
method of disqualification available to appointed commissioners as well as
to elected commissioners." 56 The court thus reads section 38.10 into the
A.P.A., holding that the proper procedure for seeking disqualification of
a commissioner is through a filed affidavit of prejudice. If the commissioner refuses to recuse himself, the party may then seek appropriate
review before the Full Commission and the Supreme Court of Florida,
the bodies which supervise the deputy commissioners.17 The court went
further and held that a blanket disqualification of a commissioner was not
available under Florida law. s
PART II: ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE [NEw]5 9
A. Definitions
For purposes of clarity, the Legislature set forth a number of definitions of the critical terms used in this part of the ACT.
(1) Agency means the governing body of any state board, commission or department, or state officer who constitutes the agency
authorized by law to adjudicate any party's legal rights, duties,
privileges or immunities, except the legislature, courts and
governor.
(2) Adjudication means agency proceeding for the formulation
of an order.
(3) Order means the whole or any part of the final decision
(whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in
form) of any agency in any matter other than rule making but
including licensing.
(4) Party means individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or public or private organizations of any character, and
any other agency allowed to intervene in an agency proceeding.
(5) License means the whole or part of any agency permit,
certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.
(6) Licensing means agency process respecting the grant, re55. Fla. Laws, 1951 ch. 26854.
56. Supra note 53, at 553.
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.25 and .27 (1965).
58. Ginsberg v. Holt, 86 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1956).
59. FLA. STAT. § 120.20 (1965)
Legislative Intent for Part II
It is the intent of the legislature to establish minimum requirements for the adjudication of any party's legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities by state agencies.
Subsequent inconsistent laws shall supersede part II only to the extent that they do
so by express reference.
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newal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal,
limitation, amendment, modification, or conditioning of a license.
(7) Agency proceeding means any agency process as defined in
subsections (2), (3), (5) and (6).6 0
2
B. Notice of Hearing"' and Hearing Guaranteed"

In Keating v. State,"3 a liquor license issued to a tenant of a building
was revdked64 by an order which further provided that no liquor license
could be issued for use at the location of the building for two years.65 The
landlord, who had no knowledge of the revocation hearing, appealed to the
Beverage Director to have the revocation order against him modified and
the Director did so. In a subsequent action,"0 the respondent, a competitor
of the landlord, succeeded in obtaining an order enjoining the Director
from modifying the original revocation. Certiorari was granted by the
supreme court because of conflicting decisions in the district courts on
the matter of standing in the respondent to challenge the order of the
Director." That court approved the respondent's standing' 8 and then set
forth the vital issues to be resolved:
(1) Does F.S. § 561.85, F.S.A., 69 violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection when it
permits the Beverage Department to issue a so-called padlocking order without notice to the landlord, and without affording the landlord an opportunity to be heard?
60. FLA. STAT. § 120.21 (1965). The word "agency" as defined in this section is sufficiently
broad so as to embrace the department of public safety. Fla. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 062-47.
61. FLA. STAT. § 120.23 (1965) provides that,
Parties affected by agency action shall be timely informed by the agency of the time,
place, and nature of any hearing; the legal authority and jurisdiction under which
the hearing is to be held; and the matters of fact and law asserted. In fixing the
time and place for hearings due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity
of the parties or their representatives. Each agency shall adopt appropriate rules
of procedure for notice and hearing.
62. FLA. STAT. § 120.22 (1965).
Any party's legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities shall be determined only
upon public hearing by an agency unless the right to public hearing is waived by the
affected party, or unless otherwise provided by law.
63. 173 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1965).
64. FLA. STAT. § 561.29 (1941) provides for the suspension of liquor licenses.
65. FLA. STAT. § 561.58 (1941) provides that the director can prohibit or permit a
license to be issued for the location of the place of business formerly operated under such
revoked license.
66. Keating v. State ex rel. Ausebel, 167 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
67. In Baker v. State ex rel.
Hi-Hat Liquors, Inc., 159 Fla. 286, 31 So. 2d 275 (1947)
it was held that a licensee had no legal standing to challenge an order affecting another's
license on the ground that it might affect his profits.
68. Supra note 63, at 675.
We are convinced that we should recede from Baker .. ., insofar as it holds that a
licensee competitor has no standing to maintain an action of the kind here involved
merely because as a business competitor the profits or commercial advantages which
he might gain in eliminating his competition "are too elusive and uncertain to sustain
the action."
69. Supra note 65.
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(2) Does a landlord have a protectable constitutional right
to have his premises used for the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages ?7o
The court answered the second question by stating, "[A] liquor
license has come to have the quality of property, with an actual pecuniary
value far in excess of the license fees exacted ....171 Further, the court
stated:
It is indeed a serious matter for government to confiscate
property, or to interfere with any legitimate use thereof ...
Under no circumstances can private property be taken by the
state without due process of law.... [T]he landlord.

. .

should

be given notice that he may be deprived of such use and an opportunity to make a defense and to be heard in opposition to
such action on the part of the State. Notice and hearing ...

are

the minimum required before a liquor license can validly be
suspended or revoked by the Director......
After determining that a constitutional right was involved the court
answered the first question by finding that section 561.58 of Florida
Statutes, standing alone, was unconstitutional, but that A.P.A. sections
120.22, 120.23, supplied the deficiency of notice and hearing in the statute.
The court stated that section 561.58 "and the appropriate sections of the
Administrative Procedure Act when taken together meet the minimum
requirements of due process of law."" It was, therefore, unnecessary to
invalidate the statute.
The modified order of the Director was allowed to stand. The appeal
taken by the landlord and the subsequent reinstatement of the landlord's
license by the Director had satisfied the requirements of due process. If the
modifying order had not been granted by the Director, however, the landlord would have been deprived of his property without procedural due
process.
The Keating decision thus makes crystal clear the import of any
statute that grants quasi-judicial power to an administrative agency. The
court held that any such agency must provide notice and hearing even
though the applicable statutes do not provide for it, lest their determination fail to comport with due process of law.
In this area the A.P.A. provides that "Each agency shall adopt
appropriate rules of procedure for notice and hearing. 7 4 It specifies the
notice procedure as follows:
70. Supra note 63, at 676.
71. Ibid.

72. Id. at 677.
73. Id. at 678.
74. FLA. STAT. § 120.23 (1965).
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Parties affected by agency action shall be timely informed by
the agency of the time, place, and nature of any hearing; the
legal authority and jurisdiction under which the
hearing is to be
75
held, and the matters of fact and law asserted.
One additional requirement of importance is contained within this section
but it has not undergone judicial interpretation. The portion reads as
follows:
In fixing the time and place for hearings, due regard shall be had
for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives.76
To date, of twenty-five agencies, thirteen 77 have adopted appropriate
rules of procedure under A.P.A. section 120.23, but twelve, 78 although they
75. Ibid. See Robins v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 162 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
The district court held, inter alia, that information did not state with any degree of exactness
when or in what specific manner he had violated provisions of FLA. STAT. 475.01, and was
insufficient to inform broker of the nature of the charges brought against him and should be
quashed.
76. In Ammerman v. Florida Bd. of Pharmacy, 174 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) a
situation arose which appears at first blush to be in contravention of this clause. The
petitioner stated, as his basic contention on appeal, the denial of procedural due process in
that the commission's hearing, on his license revocation, was held on a Sunday. The court
dismissed this point without statement.
It appears to this writer that the fixing of a hearing date for a Sunday contravenes the
language of § 120.23.
In fixing the time and place for hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience
and necessity of the parties or their representatives.
As petitioner made this Sunday hearing his major contention on appeal we can only assume
that this date was disagreeable to him. If so, then "due regard" was certainly not accorded.
It would also be noted that Sunday is usually not considered a day for conducting business,
especially the important business of conducting a hearing that affects the livelihood of the
petitioner. The petitioner's contention in this regard is well founded and the court should
have considered it to a greater extent.
77. Florida Air Pollution Comm'n, FLA. STAT. § 403. (1957) implemented by FLA. AD.
CODE, ch. 28-1 (1965); State Bd. of Cosmetology, FLA. STAT. §§ 477.16, 477.23 (1963)
implemented by FLA. AD. CODE, ch. 60-1.25 (1965); Florida Dental Examiners, FLA. STAT.
§ 466. (1961) implemented by FLA. AD. CODE, ch. 120-3.04 (1965) ; State Rd. of Health, FLA.
STAT. 381. (1955) implemented by FLA. AD. CODE, ch. 170A-1,4 (1965); Florida Hotel &
Restaurant Comm'n, FLA. STAT. § 509.261 (1957) implemented by FLA. AD. CODE, ch. 1751.02(3) (1964); Florida Installment Land Sales Rd., FiA. STAT. § 478.161 (1963); Florida
Rd. of Medical Examiners, FLA. STAT. § 458.121 (1961) implemented by FLA. AD. CODE, ch.
210A-4 (1963); Chiropractic, FLA. STAT. §§ 460.131-37 (1963); Florida State Rd. of Nursing,
FLA. STAT. § 464.21(4) (1963) implemented by FLA. AD. CODE, ch. 240-5. (1963); Professional Teaching Practices Comm'n, FLA. STAT. § 231.28 (1963); Florida R.R. & Pub. Util.
Comm'n, FLA. STAT. §§ 323., 347., 350., 364., 366. (1957) implemented by FLA. AD. CODE,
ch. 310. (1963); Florida Real Estate Comm'n, FLA. STAT. § 475. (1947) implemented by
FLA. AD. CODE, ch. 315A-16 (1963); Florida Watchmakers Comm'n, FLA. STAT. § 489.09
(1964).
78. Florida Rd. of Architecture, FLA. STAT. §§ 467.08, 467.14 (1951); Florida Industrial
Comm'n, FLA. STAT. § 215.19 (1957); Motor Vehicle Comm'n, FA. STAT. §§ 320.65-66
(1941); Naturopathy, FLA. STAT. § 462.15 (1963); Florida State Rd. of Dispensing Opticians,
FLA. STAT. § 484.10 (1963); State Rd. of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, FLA. STAT. § 459.14
(1927); Florida Rd. of Pharmacy, FLA. STAT. § 465.101 (1963); Florida State Rd. of
Examiners of Psychology, FLA. STAT. § 490.081 (1963); Florida Sec. Comm'n, FLA. STAT.
§§ 517.11,16,19,20 (1961); Structural Pest Control Comm'n, FLA. STAT. § 482.171 (1963);
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provide for notice and hearing in one form or another, apparently fail to
provide all of the statutory essentials.79
The Keating case and the A.P.A. strongly suggest that if an agency
does not adopt appropriate rules and abide by them fully in its procedure
the courts will demand full notice and hearing as satisfaction of the
requirements of procedural due process. The Keating case application of
the A.P.A. has constructed the foundation which may well lead to a uniformity of procedure in notice and hearing requisites.
The need for such uniformity regarding notice was highlighted in
Roper v. Structural Pest Control Comm'n.s° In Roper the petitioner was
served notice under section 482.171(1) of Florida Statutes which simply
provides for "reasonable notice" of a hearing. No other statute required
a more specific period of time for notice of the hearing. The petitioner
in Roper was given ten days' notice but the date of the hearing was included. He thereafter urged that because he had only ten days to prepare
for the hearing he had been denied due process. The court apparently
anxious to validate the proceedings of the commission, took judicial
notice of a rule of the respondent-commission requiring ten days' notice
before a hearing,8' and held that the day of the hearing was included
within the ten days. The case raises two questions: (1) What constitutes
"reasonable notice" as to time allowed before a hearing? (2) Why should
each agency set an arbitrary number of days?
The ten-day rule has since been replaced by a twenty-day rule, s and
the situation with this agency has been somewhat alleviated, but the problem still exists as to a uniformity of rules for length of notice for all
agencies. Legislation to require a specific number of days for notice is
suggested and any such requirement should be similar to the requirement
of A.P.A. section 120.041(3), which requires of all agencies uniform notice
before a rule becomes operative.
C. Conduct and Record of Hearing88
In Nicholas v. Wainwright,84 a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus
questioned the legality of his detention, contending that his "gain time"
had been illegally cancelled by the Deputy Director of the Board of Commissioners of State Institutions.
Florida Barbers' Sanitary Comm'n, FLA. STAT. §§ 476.15,31 (1941) ; Florida Beverage Dep't,
§ 561.29(3), 561.58 (1961).
79. An agency may fail to provide notice of either the legal authority and jurisdiction
under which the hearing is being held; the matters of law and fact asserted; or the nature
of the hearing; or fail to provide notice and hearing to all persons affected by the agency's
actions. Supra note 74.
80. Supra note 32.
81. Id. at 847.
82. FLA. STAT. § 482.171 (1959) implemented by FLA. AD. CODE ch. 333-6.01 (1963).
83. FLA. STAT. § 120.24 (1965).
84. 152 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1963).

FLA. STAT.
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The applicable statute85 provided that upon good behavior a prisoner
could be released on recommendation to the Board by the Director, prior
to the terminal date fixed by sentence. In this case, however, no recommendation was made, and the prisoner was questioning the duty of the

Deputy Director to withhold his recommendation. In denying the
prisoner's writ the court held that this prerogative of the Director fell
within his power as a hearing officer. The court stated, "The Legislature has recognized the propriety of a hearing officer as a functionary of
an administrative agency by the enactment of chapter 120. .. ."s6 The
court concluded that it was without power to act, as "the final responsibility for forfeiting gain time must be exercised by the Board itself""7 and
that this must be done pursuant to recommendation by the Director.
The case presented an extreme situation88 in terms of the power in the
hearing officer; in the more usual case, the hearing officer is estopped from
acting individually.89 Only the agency itself (the Board) has the power of
final determination. 0 Moreover, A.P.A. section 120.28 provides that
No hearing examiner shall, in any proceeding where he has
presided as hearing examiner or a factually related proceeding,
participate or advise the agency in entering its order except
through his recommended order.
D. Agency's and Examiner's Hearing Powers"'
The agency, member of the agency, or the hearing examiner shall

have authority, subject to the agency's published rules, to

85. FLA. STAT. § 944.28 (1965).
86. Supra note 84, at 460.
87. Id. at 461.
88. The court suggested that in a situation such as this the Legislature should enact
further legislation to avoid this difficulty of presenting prisoner's qualifications as to gain
time.
89. In Thorn v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 146 So.2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) the
court stated that the statutes that provide for a hearing examiner make no provision for, nor
do they give force and effect to, his findings.
90. In holding hearings or in utilizing the hearing examiner method of conducting
hearings the executive board of the department of public safety must officially call
the hearing, designate the time and place for such hearing, give notice thereof, and
in cases where a hearing examiner is used, designate the person or persons before
whom the hearing is to be held. In this regard, the executive board is required to
adopt appropriate rules of procedure for notice and hearing as required by § 120.23.
The conduct and record of such hearing is set forth in § 120.24; and the hearing
examiner's powers are contained in this section. All parties are to be afforded the
right to participate in the proceedings as set forth in § 120.26. The hearing examiner
would make a recommended order to the executive board, which order must include
findings of fact as required by subsection (8) of this section. However, it would be
the executive board that would be the sole trier of facts; and it would be the executive board that would render the final decision with respect to a hearing held before
an examiner. Op. ArTIY GEN. 062-47.
The state board of medical examiners may delegate to a panel consisting of three of
its members the following duties: take testimony at administrative hearings,
make findings of fact, and submit a recommended order to the board. However, the
board cannot abdicate its responsibility for final determination of matters and entry
of proper orders. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 063-93.
91. FIA. STAT. § 120.25 (1965).
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(1) Administer oaths and affirmations,
(2) Issue subpoenas authorized by law,
(3) Rule upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence,
(4) Take or cause depositions to be taken whenever the ends of
justice would be served thereby,
(5) Regulate the course of the hearing,
(6) Hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the
issues by consent of the parties,
(7) Dispose of procedural requests or similar matters, and
(8) Enter any order to carry out the purposes of this law, or as
to a member of the agency or hearing examiner make
recommended orders to the agency ...

which orders shall

include findings of fact.
In Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. King,92 the Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission issued an order which granted only partially a motor
carrier's application for extension of its certificate. The only stated basis
of its ruling was that public convenience and necessity demanded the
modification. The petitioner-motor carrier contended that the order was
not predicated on a finding of facts stated in the record. The Florida
Supreme Court agreed and stated:
It is crystal clear from the face of the Commission's order that
no findings of fact are contained therein which the Commission
predicated its ultimate conclusion. .

.

. The Commission . . .

neglected to follow the mandate of... Chapter 120, Administrative Procedure Act, Section 120.25 (8) ....

1

The court predicated its opinion upon language used by the United States
Supreme Court.94
The question is not merely one of the absence of elaboration or
of a suitably complete Statement of the grounds of the Commission's determination ...

but of the lack of the basis or essential

findings required to support the Commission's order. In the
absence of such findings, we are not called upon to examine the
evidence in order to resolve opposing contentions as to what it
shows or to spell out and state such conclusions of fact as it may
permit. The Commission is the fact-finding body and the Court
examines the evidence not to make findings for the Commission
but to ascertain whether its findings are properly supported."
92.
93.
94.
95.

146 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1962).
Id. at 372.
Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931).
Id. at 215.
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In Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,96 discussed earlier,
the court echoed this aspect of the Central Truck Lines case by stating
that in such cases the appellate courts are not the fact finding bodies; by
virtue of the A.P.A., boards, bureaus, agencies and commissions are the
"fact finders" and are required to show their findings of fact on the essential issues which justify their orders. 7 In Polar the petitioner was charged
by the Florida Milk Commission with violation of chapter 501, Florida
Statutes, relating to the regulation of the state milk industry. After a
hearing before the commission, at which testimony by both parties was
heard, the commission, without making findings of fact, entered an order
revoking petitioner's license. The court held that
[T]he "Administrative Procedure Act," does not contemplate
that agencies having the attributes of a "fact-finder" are required to outline step by step the evidentiary facts leading to the
ultimate conclusion, but means that findings of fact on essential
issues must be such as to justify the entry of the final order."
The reader will recall the prior altercation between the milk commission and Polar previously discussed.99 The present action was a continuation of that disagreement. A reading of the cases together serves as an
example of the importance of the A.P.A. In both instances the milk
commission apparently overstepped its bounds and disregarded established procedure; both times the A.P.A. was applied and the commission
was thwarted.
An interesting question regarding the power of a hearing examiner
was raised in Kirk v. Publix Supermarkets.'"0 The petitioner, Kirk, filed
a Workmen's Compensation claim for benefits and remedial treatment.
The claim was controverted by the employer. On motion by employer the
deputy ordered the petitioner to submit to a physical examination and to
produce for the employer's attorney copies of reports of physicians who
had previously examined or treated him and records relating to his admission to two hospitals. The deputy stated in the order that failure to
comply would result in a dismissal of the claim. Petitioner complied with
the requirement of the physical examination, but refused to submit the
requested reports, and at the final hearing the petitioner claimed that the
reports were work products and privileged. The deputy rejected the argument and the petitioner requested an appealable order. The deputy dismissed the claim and stated that the petitioner's claim would not be
96. 150 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
97. Accord, McRae v. Robbins, 151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942); Laney v. Holbrook,
150 Fla. 622, 8 So.2d 465 (1942); Six Mile Creek Kennel Club v. State Racing Comm'n,
119 Fla. 142, 161 So. 58 (1935). See Part II(E) infra.
98. Supra note 96, at 506. (Emphasis added.)
99. Supra Part I, notes 20, et seq.
100. 185 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
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entitled to further consideration until he complied with the order to
produce. The Full Commission affirmed the deputy's order.
On review the court stated that the deputy could compel the petitioner to produce the reports, and then continued to the more critical
question of whether the deputy had the power to dismiss a claim in the
event that a party refused to make discovery when ordered to do so. The
deputy had followed Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.31 which allows a
court to stay proceedings or to dismiss the action under such circumstances. The court said, "It would seem logical that a deputy ought to have
the same power; however, we are forced to conclude that he does not."' 0'1
Citing section 440.33, Florida Statutes, the court noted that this section
requires that a deputy certify the facts to the appropriate circuit court.. 2
whenever a person neglects or refuses to produce any document after
having been ordered to do so. It is then the circuit court which determines
whether to dismiss or to otherwise punish the refusal as a contempt of the
court. The court concluded,
It is elemental that when the Legislature provides that an administrative power shall be exercised in a certain way such prescription precludes the doing of it in another way. We are therefore
forced to conclude that the deputy did not under these facts have
the authority to dismiss the claim, and that he should have certified the matter to the circuit court pursuant to Sec. 440.33."08

Highly interesting was the dissenting opinion of Justice Ervin. He
felt that section 120.25 of the A.P.A. authorized the deputy commissioner
to proceed as he did. He correctly pointed out that the A.P.A. relates to all
administrative proceedings of state agencies, including their hearings and
adjudications. In this the A.P.A. is supplemental to, in that it replaces,
prior laws regulating hearings and administrative procedures.
Section 120.25, later in time than § 440.33(2), provides that a
state agency, through its hearing examiner (in this instance the
Deputy Commissioner) may issue subpoenas authorized by law,
rule upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence, dispose
of procedural requests or similar matters, regulate the course of
a hearing,
and "enter any order to carry out the purposes of this
104
law.'

He concluded his opinion by stating:
Armed with this authority, I think it lay within the power of the
Deputy to enforce his order to require the claimant to produce
for the employer's attorney copies of reports. .

.

. Compliance

101. Id. at 163.
102. The court construed the language "appropriate court" contained in § 440.33 to
mean circuit court in the county where the deputy is acting.
103. Supra note 100, at 164. (Emphasis added.)
104. Ibid.
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could be enforced either by suspension or dismissal of the
claim. 0 "
The writer is prone to agree with Justice Ervin in this respect. The
A.P.A. is ostensibly designed to create uniform rules of procedure for
state agencies. Given this pervading legislative intention and the encompassing list of broad hearing powers afforded the hearing examiner under
section 120.25, it would seem only logical that the A.P.A. was meant to
supersede other procedures set forth long before the A.P.A. was made
operative. Indeed, if the A.P.A. received so narrow an interpretation as to
allow various agencies to utilize diverse and unrelated procedures, the
main purpose of uniformity would clearly be defeated.
E. Procedures for Due Process During Hearing
The procedural rights afforded the individual when he participates in
an agency hearing are clearly enumerated in the A.P.A. itself:
(1) To present his case or defense by oral and documentary
evidence,
(2) To submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such crossexamination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of
the facts,
(3) To submit for the consideration of the hearing examiner,
member of the agency, or the agency if it receives the evidence,
proposed findings and conclusions and supporting reasons therefor,
(4) To submit exceptions to the order of the agency or to a
recommended order, if one is made, and make oral arguments in
support of any such exceptions,
(5) To mike offers of settlement or proposals of adjustment,
(6) To be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or
to represent himself, and
(7) To be promptly notified of the denial in whole or in part of
any written application, petition or other request, and of any
other agency action affecting substantive or procedural rights
taken in connection with any agency proceeding. 0 6
Although the A.P.A. is primarily concerned with state agencies and
as such is binding only upon state agencies, it can be expected that the
standard procedure for assuring due process will be applied to municipal
and county agencies when cases concerning hearings of these agencies
come before the courts. Procedural due process should mean the same
thing before all agencies, be they state or local.
105. Ibid.
106. FLA. STAT. § 120.26 (1965).
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F. Evidence
The hearing examiner, member of the agency, or agency shall
give probative effect to evidence which would be admissible in
civil proceedings in the courts of this state, but in receiving evidence due regard shall be given to the technical and highly complicated subject matter agencies must handle and the exclusionary rules of evidence shall not be used to prevent the receipt
of evidence having substantial probative effect. Otherwise effect
shall be
given to the rules of evidence recognized by law in this
07
state.1

No case was decided during the Survey period directly touching upon
this section of the A.P.A., but it should be noted that there have been
previous judicial interpretations of the evidentiary practices of administrative agencies. In Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Feinglass °8
the court stated the general rule:
We note as a general rule, administrative tribunals are not bound
by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing jury
trials ....
PART III: JUDICIAL REvIEW

A. DeclaratoryJudgment on Validity of Rules
(1) Any affected party may obtain a judicial declaration as to
the validity, meaning or application of any rule by bringing an
action for a declaratory judgment in the circuit court of the
county in which such person resides or in which the executive
offices of the agency are maintained. This subsection shall not
apply to chapter 212.
(2) In addition to any other ground which may exist, any rule
may be declared invalid, in whole or in part, for a substantial
failure to comply with the provisions of this chapter, or in the
case of any emergency rule, upon the ground that the facts
recited in the statement do not constitute an emergency."x 0
As this section of the A.P.A. has been discussed under the rule making
procedure of administrative agencies"' and especially with regard to
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,"' it will not be belabored
here.
107. FLA. STAT. § 120.27 (1965).
108. 166 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
109. Id. at 687. Accord, Sauls v. DeLoach, 182 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Agner
v. Smith, 167 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). See also note 125 infra.
110. FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1965).
111. See Part I: RuLE MAKING, and notes 20-29 supra.

112. 146 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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B. Review of Agency Orders
Perhaps the most progressive and revolutionary innovation of the
A.P.A. is contained in section 120.31(1) dealing with the judicial review
of administrative orders.
Because of the pertinent language contained in this section and the
judicial interpretation afforded it in the following cases the relevant portions are set forth below.
(1) As an alternative procedure for judicial review, and except
where appellate review is now made directly by the supreme
court, the final orders of an agency entered in any agency proceeding, or in the exercise of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority, shall be reviewable by certiorari by the district courts of
appeal within the time and manner prescribed by the Florida
appellate rules. If judicial review is sought under this section,
the petition shall so state. The venue of the proceedings for such
review shall be the appellate district which includes the county
wherein hearings before the hearing officer or agency, as the case
may be, are conducted, or if the venue cannot be thus determined, then the appellate district wherein the agency's executive
offices are located.
(2) In cases where certiorari is granted pursuant to this section, the court may issue its mandate, or order, with directions to
the agency to enter such order in the proceedings as is appropriate on the record, or the court may remand the cause for such
further proceedings, including the taking of testimony, as may to
the court seem necessary or proper:
(a) To accord the parties due process of law;
(b) To establish a sufficient record, for review;
(c) To accord the parties their constitutional, statutory or procedural rights; and
(d) To accomplish the purposes and objectives of the
law pursuant to which the administrative proceeding was
initiated. 1 '
In Rogers v. King".4 the Florida Real Estate Commission entered an
order revoking real estate salesmen's licenses. On appeal, the district
court, although finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the
examiner's findings that the salesmen were guilty, quashed the order, and
directed the commission to "punish the petitioners in like manner as by
said order it punished their co-defendant .... ,,"5 The effect of this decision was to order the commission to reduce the revocation of the sales113. FLA. STAT. § 120.31 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
114. 161 So.2d 258 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1964).
115. Id. at 259.
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men's licenses to a six-month suspension, thus substituting the court's
judgment for that of the agency. This decision was upheld by the Florida
Supreme Court in Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. Rogers,"6 as not
marginal to the statutes of Florida governing commissions." 7
The court stated that final rulings and orders of the commission shall
be subject to change upon writ of certiorari issued to the district courts of
appeal, as provided by the A.P.A. It quoted section 120.31(2):
In cases where certiorari is granted pursuant to this section, the
court may issue its mandate, or order, with directions to the
agency to enter such order in the proceedings as is appropriate
on the record, or the court may remand the cause for such further
proceedings, including the taking of testimony, as may to the
court seem necessary or proper ....

What the court did in essence was to interpret section 120.31(2) as
a broadening of certiorari, granting to the district courts" 9 the power,
when reviewing an administrative order, to reweigh the evidence in the
record and upon finding that the order is inappropriate to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency. The court concluded:
[W]hile the Legislature vested in the Real Estate Commission
the power to suspend licenses for such period of time as it
thought appropriate to the circumstances, or to revoke the same,
it also gave the district courts the power to review such action
and to enter such orders with reference thereto as it determined
appropriate on the record before it. This power necessarily includes the power 2to
modify or increase the penalties imposed by
0
the Commission.

Justice Barnes, dissenting, 2 ' decried the portent of the decision. To
his view, it was not the Legislature's intention to broaden the nature of
certiorari power in this manner. The A.P.A. only provides for judicial
review,
[A]nd does not indicate an intent to grant a power to the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the commission,
or the judgments of the scores of other governmental agencies
rendered in quasi-judicial proceedings.' 22
116. 176 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1965).
117. The court coupled the statutory provisions for writ of certiorari, as concerns real
estate license law in FLA. STAT. § 475.35 (1947), with the additional power as provided by
the A.P.A.
118. Supra note 116, at 67. (Emphasis is the court's.)
119. In Sauls v. DeLoach, supra note 109, the court read § 120.31(3) together with the
certiorari power provided by FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 5(3).
120. Supra note 116, at 67. (Emphasis added.)
121. Id. at 67.
122. Id. at 68. (Emphasis is the court's.)
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Under the Rogers decision the court may well have decided that the
judicial function includes the responsibility to review de novo every
penalty imposed by an administrative agency. If employed with appropriate judicial restraint, which would offer de novo review only to the more
serious violations of agency discretion, this broadened scope of certiorari
may yield a very desirable check on administrative abuse. It apparently
had this effect in Rogers.
Nonetheless the decision is contrary to a number of previous cases. 28
Until this decision the Florida courts were almost unanimous in holding
that it was never appropriate to substitute their judgment for that of the
agency. 1 24 The established scope of review has been to limit certiorari to
determine whether procedural due process had been accorded the party
by the agency, whether the agency had jurisdiction of the cause, whether
essential elements of law had been observed by the agency, or whether
the charges were supported by substantial competent evidence. 2 5 Indeed,
the Rogers case was brought before the Florida Supreme Court on conflict
certiorari.' 2 6 The second district in Carter v. Florida Real Estate
Comm'n, 2 7 a case analogous in proceeding to Rogers, but holding conversely, related:
This court is not in a position to determine, as a matter of law,
that the six month's suspension would render the order of the
123. E.g., Butler v. Carter, 123 So.2d 313, 316 (Fla. 1960).
[T]he findings and conclusions of the Commission will not be set aside on certiorari,
even though the reviewing court might have reached different conclusions on tWe
evidence.
Degroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957); City of Pensacola v. Maxwell, 49 So.2d 527
(Fla. 1950); Pensacola Transit, Inc. v. Douglass, 34 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1948); McFall v.
Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 173 So.2d 458 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) (circuit judge
reviewing case on certiorari cannot substitute personal opinion for the opinion of the
Board); Central & So. Florida Flood Control Dist. v. Scott, 169 So.2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964) (courts should not substitute their judgment for that of governmental agencies);
Agner v. Smith, 167 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners
v. Feinglass, 166 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Dade County v. Carmichael, 165 So.2d 227
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); City of Miami v. Babey, 161 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Pauline
v. Lee, 147 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Carter v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 122
So.2d 420 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
124. Ibid.
125. Butler v. Carter, supra note 123; DeGroot v. Sheffield, supra note 123; Pensacola
Transit, Inc. v. Douglass, supra note 123; McGuaran v. Susskind, 175 So.2d 218 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1965); McFall v. Florida Bd. of Dental Examiners, supra note 123; Agner v. Smith,
supra note 123; Dade County v. Carmichael, supra note 123. For an extensive study of the
substantial evidence rule see Parsons, The Substantial Evidence Rule in Florida Administrative Law, 6 U. FLA. L. Rav. 481 (1953).
126. The supreme court in Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. Rogers, supra note 116, at
65, stated:
In the decision sub judice, the First District Court held that the Carter case, supra,
"is distinguishable from the case on review because the facts here involved are such
that we are in a position to determine, as a matter of law, that the Commission
abused its discretion in imposing the subject sentences on the petitioners." We agree
with the contention of petitioner that these two decisions are in conflict.
127. 122 So.2d 420 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
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Commission invalid. To do so would be to substitute the judgment of this court for that of the respondent. 8
Now, although substantial competent evidence must still be present to
support a finding, a penal type ruling may nevertheless be overruled or
modified as the case may be, even if such evidence is present; in other
words, substantial competent evidence is no longer the standard for determining the correctness of an agency's decision, at least where the decision is penal in its nature.
Since the supreme court's decision in Rogers there have been three
further decisions applying section 120.3 1,129 and interestingly enough two
of those cases have been from the second district, the district overruled by
Rogers. The court in Davis v. State, 8 ° citing Rogers, and quoting from
section 120.31(2), reversed a disciplinary action of the State Dental
Board. The three-month suspension of petitioner's license for having
unintentionally displayed an oversized sign was ".

.

. inordinately severe

and constitutes an abuse of the discretion vested in the board by the
statute."'' The court also based its conclusion on the principle that
a corresponding responsibility rests upon such boards and
agencies to refrain from taking such disciplinary action as will
seriously reflect upon or destroy the good name and reputation of
those under their jurisdiction
except in cases which fully warrant
82
such extreme action.

The situation presented in Davis is but another illustration of the importance of the Rogers broadening of the review power of the courts.
In Sugar Cane Growers Co-op v. Florida Revenue ComM'n,188 involving a revenue commission's order setting a deficiency levy for sales
and use tax, the second district held that there had been an abuse of
discretion on the part of the commission in the assessment of an additional
maximum penalty of twenty-five percent for late payment of taxes. The
court, quashing the penalty, stated:
This Court has authority to review such penalties under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120,
F.S.A., Florida Real Estate Commission v. Rogers. ..."'
A question which still remains open is whether the court will sub128. Id. at 421.
129. Sauls v. DeLoach, supra note 109; Davis v. State, 181 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1st Dist.

1965) ; and Sugar Cane Growers Co-op. v. Florida Revenue Comm'n, 179 So.2d 393 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1965). For one of the rare occasions before Rogers, see Florida Bar v. Rassner, 161
So.2d 1 (Fla. 1964).
130. 181 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
131. Id. at 562.
132. Id. at 561.
133. 179 So.2d 393 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
134. Id. at 396.
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stitute its judgment when necessary, for the scores of county and municipal agencies not within the A.P.A. In McGuaran v. Susskind3 3 a City of
Miami Beach detective was removed from office by the Personnel Board
of the City of Miami Beach. The Third District Court of Appeal acknowledged that the extent of its review was limited to whether, upon the
points properly raised, the circuit court applied the applicable law and
acted in accordance with the established procedure." 6 The court cited
City of Miami v. Babey 13 7 as authority for this proposition. In Babey
the court had stated that ".

.

. it was not the prerogative of the circuit

court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board."'3 8 McGuaran
also relied upon Ammerman v. FloridaBd. of Pharmacy'39 which similarly
was concerned with the "substantial evidence rule."'"4 Although Ammerman was concerned with a state agency as opposed to McGuaran and
Babey, it did not purport to discuss any of the provisions of the A.P.A.,
including section 120.31(2), which was applicable to that case. As a
result the decision indicated the absence of A.P.A. influence upon the
McGuarancourt. It is interesting to note that all of the above cited cases
were decided in the Third District Court of Appeal, which to date has
not recognized A.P.A. section 120.31(2) or the Rogers decision, even
though again recently confronted with the situation. In FloridaState Bd.
of Dental Examiners v. Graham,'4 ' petitioner's license to practice dentistry
was suspended for six months. As a prerequisite for reinstatement petitioner had to undergo a psychiatric examination whose results were
satisfactory to the agency. The circuit court quashed the order in its
entirety, and on appeal the third district reversed in part, reinstating the
six-month suspension.' 4 ' In reversing the circuit court, the district court
held that there was substantial competent evidence to support the findings
of the agency and as such they must be sustained.' The court further
held that
It is well established that a reviewing court will not on petition
for certiorari determine the weight and credibility of the evidence.' 44
In so holding, the court cited Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.
Feinglass,149 McFall v. Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners,146 and
135.
136.
3d Dist.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
able and
143.
144.
145.
146.

175 So.2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
Emphasis added. The court cited Morris v. City of Hialeah, 140 So.2d 615 (Fla.
1962).
161 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
Id. at 232.
174 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
Supra note 125.
187 So.2d 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
The court held that the prerequisite of the psychiatric examination was unreasonan abuse of power. The court cited §§ 120.22-.23 and 120.26.
Emphasis added.
Supra note 141, at 106.
166 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
173 So.2d 458 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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Ammerman v. FloridaBd. of Pharmacy.'47 It would appear that each of
these decisions has been overruled by Rogers and should not have been
relied upon in the Graham decision. Ammerman and McFall both held
that the findings of an administrative agency will be overturned on review
only upon a showing that they are not supported by "substantial competent evidence" and Feinglass held that the question of both weight and
credibility of evidence is one for the agency's determination and not for
the court and as such the court should decline to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. Furthermore, in Graham the court failed to mention the provisions of section 120.31 relating to review, but relied instead
on section 120.27, which deals primarily with the procedure for receiving
evidence by the agency. 4 While section 120.27 had not previously
undergone judicial interpretation, it is the writer's opinion that in view of
section 120.31, section 120.27 was not meant to be applied to determine
the extent of appellate power. For one thing, section 120.27 falls within
the A.P.A. subpart, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE, whereas
section 120.31 is placed under the subpart,

JUDICIAL

REVIEW. Neither the

cases cited in Graham nor section 120.27 appear to have been applicable.
The court would have been better advised to have applied section 120.31
and the decisions thereunder.
The portent of the Rogers decision is more readily suggested by a
glance through the history of Florida administrative agencies. These
bodies have reigned over the breadth of our economic and political life,
secure in the knowledge their judgments would be relatively free from
judicial interference. The only limitations were that their judgments be
grounded on substantial evidence and tempered with a modicum of procedural due process. The Rogers decision may very well become a hallmark in a new era of judicial review of administrative law in Florida.
147. 174 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).

148. See text supra Part II, section F, and note 109.

